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The purpose of this essay is to investigate the nature of the
term “progressive” both in its historical context and as a political
concept. I do so by combining political history, the history of ideas,
and political philosophy, with the goal of elucidating key themes
that lie at the core of contemporary progressive politics.
The essay has four main sections. The first provides an
account of progressivism as it has been understood in the recent
1
history of the United States. The second offers a discussion of the
2
development of the modern concept of “progress.” The third uses
the work of John Rawls to explore the roles of neutrality and
context in political policy and rationality—a theme that runs
3
throughout much progressive literature. The fourth examines the
relationship between morality and the free market with special
attention to Adam Smith, the eighteenth-century progenitor of
4
modern capitalism.
I conclude with a brief and tentative
5
definition of “progressive” that I hope will spark further discussion.
A great deal has been left out of this essay, not the least of
which is the progressive educational movement, as typified by John
Dewey and others. I am selective in my approach in order to
emphasize those issues that are the most relevant to contemporary
discourse. My discussion covers a great deal of ground and relies
upon methodologies from a range of disciplines. For this reason, I
have, in most cases, presented centrist and moderate interpretation
of the thinkers I cite. I have also eschewed frequent reference to
secondary literature so as to avoid getting mired in subtle issues of
interpretation.
I make no claims as to the definitive nature of my observations
and conclusions. This discussion should be seen as preliminary at
best, and on the occasion of this special issue of the William Mitchell
Law Review, my intent is to present an introductory exploration that
helps explicate themes that are found throughout the essays that
follow.
I.

PROGRESSIVISM IN THE UNITED STATES

The term “progressive” is not straightforward. The more one
delves into its history in the United States, the more evident it
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
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becomes that there is no one set of principles or single ideology
that unifies those who fall under its moniker. Today, American
6
progressives are on the political left; that much is clear. But how
far left on the spectrum they fall is uncertain. They are not
revolutionaries. They seek change, not social upheaval, although
sometimes this change is significant and can be traumatic. Nor are
progressives so far to the extreme that they are in bed with the
7
right.
Progressives are strongly attached to the government; they
tend towards state intervention. Yet, they also believe in citizen
participation and grassroots action. Perhaps more than any other
political classification, progressives hold onto the ideal of direct
democracy. They heartily embrace the tensions between what
Isaiah Berlin called negative and positive freedoms, or freedom
8
from and freedom to, respectively. For Berlin, the freedom from
hindrance, or “negative” liberty, trumps the freedom to self9
actualize, but progressives disagree. Today’s progressives might
argue that, while liberty is important, it is incoherent without
entitlements. The state must provide social, political, economic,
and cultural assistance to those who are denied access to an equal
playing field. Progressives claim that one cannot have liberty
without cultivating capabilities.
The role of progressivism is further complicated by the
contemporary political climate. In a post-Willie Horton world, the
word “liberal” is deemed by many to be political suicide. The term
“progressive” is the most likely candidate to fill its role. As one
Democratic activist in North Dakota reported to me, she uses the
term precisely because it sounds more centrist to her audience than
the term liberal. The tragic death of Paul Wellstone, Minnesota’s
most promising liberal, was portrayed as the death of a Minnesota
10
progressive. His memorial service, a political event used by the
right to further delegitimize its opponents, occurred a few years
6. This is in contrast to Canada, for example, where the Progressive
Conservative Party is right of center.
7. This odd convergence is the purview of libertarians (and, on occasion,
single-issue interest groups such as those who oppose pornography).
8. Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in THE PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND
191, 194–206 (Henry Hardy & Roger Hausheer eds., 1998). Berlin regards a
commitment to positive freedom as a dangerous form of Hegelian proto-fascism.
9. Id. at 212–16.
10. Jack Russell Weinstein, Democrats Must Stop Apologizing for Liberal Beliefs,
THE GRAND FORKS HERALD (N.D.), Nov. 13, 2003, available at http://www.und.
nodak.edu/instruct/weinstei/gfheraldnov13.htm.
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before the passing of the elder icon of Minnesota progressivism,
Eugene McCarthy.
A. Twentieth Century Progressivism
McCarthy’s Minnesota Progressive Party—the party formed to
support his 1988 bid for president—was not the first to bear the
name. The first national Progressive Party ran Theodore Roosevelt
11
for president in 1912.
But Roosevelt’s party did not have a
monopoly on progressive thought. The descriptor was used by a
disparate group of political movements responding to and
inspiring large scale political and institutional changes during the
early twentieth century: two decades that saw the women’s suffrage
movement, the labor movement, an active conservation movement,
increasing industrialization, a large scale increase in government
regulations, education reform, and increased urbanization, to
name some of the more major political concerns. “Despite the
Republican capitalist approach, there was also a strong and
successful socialist movement during much of the early Progressive
12
Era.” This tension between socialism and capitalism foreshadows
contemporary progressive attachment to both governmental
regulation and direct political participation.
As corporate interests in America became more powerful,
historians of the Progressive Era point to a widespread realization
that these businesses were a corrupting force on American politics.
11. Roosevelt ran as a progressive after the Republican Party refused to
nominate him. This was Lincoln’s Republican Party, not George W. Bush’s G.O.P.
They supported women’s suffrage, labor reform, farm relief, health insurance in
industry, and taxes on inheritance. Early twentieth-century Democrats were still
associated with the depression of the 1890s and were minorities in all but some
southern states, whereas the Republicans, although they “spoke for and endorsed
the work of the nation’s capitalists,” did so through “advocacy of governmental
action to promote economic growth,” and inspired a “broad coalition of
prosperous farmers, urban workers, and businessmen.”
Lewis L. Gould,
Introduction to THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 1, 5–6 (Lewis L. Gould ed., 1974).
12. Socialists won mayoral races in:
Massachusetts, Wisconsin, and other industrial states; party members sat
in state legislatures, and a handful went to the House of Representatives.
The perennial presidential candidate of the Socialist Party, Eugene V.
Debs, saw his vote increase from 94,000 in 1900 to nearly 900,000 in
1912. A variety of daily and weekly newspapers carried socialism’s
message into all sections of the nation. Ranging from the Industrial
Workers of the World to the moral political aims of Debs, socialism was a
genuine third force of the American political landscape.
Id. at 7.
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By the close of Roosevelt’s presidency, “[one] percent of American
companies . . . turned out nearly [forty-five] percent of the nation’s
manufactured goods.
Smaller businessmen and idle-class
professionals . . . spearheaded an emerging effort to tame business
13
giants through strengthened regulatory legislation.” In turn, the
very structure of American society shifted to follow the dominant
business model: “The United States became an organized,
bureaucratic society whose model institution was a large
14
corporation.”
Simultaneously,
though,
“interest-group
organizations of all sorts successfully forged permanent, non15
electoral means of influencing the government and its agencies.”
The more bureaucratic social organizations became, the more the
population sought to find methods of political participation
outside the bureaucracy.
There is a strong strand of populism here, but there is also a
reworking of procedural democracy that was both a factor in, and a
reaction to, a fundamental shift in American governing policy:
Where nineteenth-century policy had generally focused
on distinct groups and locales (most characteristically
through the distribution of resources and privileges to
enterprising
individuals
and
corporations),
the
government now began to take explicit account of
clashing interests and to assume the responsibility for
mitigating
their
conflicts
through
regulation,
16
administration, and planning.
American students are generally taught that politics is the
negotiation of compromise among numerous conflicting special
interest groups, but this was not always the case. The focus on
allocating resources to groups rather than to regions is an
outgrowth of progressive political participation. On the one hand,
progressivism saw an increase in grassroots political participation,
returning authority to the individual citizen. On the other, it
endorsed an increase in power centralization. For progressives, the
government takes the primary role in creating the rules of political
and, perhaps, social engagement. It also negotiates minimal
standards of living and working. It is therefore fair to argue that

13. Id. at 2.
14. Richard L. McCormick, The Discovery That Business Corrupts Politics: A
Reappraisal of the Origins of Progressivism, 86 AM. HIST. REV. 247, 248 (1981).
15. Id. at 251.
16. Id.
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progressivism initiated the next stage in “the modern American
liberal state . . . with its bureaucratically centralized structure and
17
concern for social welfare.” The disparate causes, methods, and
philosophical and political aims of the period make it impossible to
classify all these groups as sharing any substantive commonalities
larger than the desire for change itself. What unified the
Progressive Era was the spirit of reform.
B. Nineteenth Century Reforms
Once again, however, we have to go farther back in history to
understand the early twentieth century reformist outlook. In 1879,
Henry George’s influential Progress and Poverty argued that suffering
and poverty were not necessary components of the modern world,
18
particularly since the nation’s wealth continued to grow. Building
on Christian principles, he argued that “social justice and
19
Christianity were synonymous.” This marked a significant change
in religious politics. Churches at the time were “largely for the
mutual insurance of the prosperous families, and not for the
20
upbuilding of the great under-class of humanity.” In response,
socially conscious Christians participated in the Social Gospel
Movement, a political force moved forward by Charles Sheldon’s
21
influential novel In His Steps.
This concern for poverty proved to be widespread. The Social
Gospel Movement, combined with secular settlement houses such
as the Henry Street Settlement in New York City in 1886 and the
famous Hull House in Chicago in 1888, resulted in “more than a
22
hundred settlements in 1900 and four hundred by 1910.”
Religious activists’ interaction with the poor led them to advocate
for “cleaner streets, more play grounds, and better schools . . . new
child labor laws, factory inspection, regulation of working hours,
taxation of inheritance, and strict regulation, or even confiscation
23
of natural monopolies like public utilities.”
17. William G. Anderson, Progressivism: An Historiographical Essay, 6 HIST.
TCHR. 427, 427 (1973).
18. Stanley P. Caine, The Origins of Progressivism, in THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 11,
11 (Lewis L. Gould ed., 1974).
19. Id. at 13.
20. Id.
21. Perhaps for the first time in such a context, this novel asked the question
“What Would Jesus Do?” Id.
22. Id. at 14.
23. Id.
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Religious movements were supplemented by an academic
movement: scholars of the time challenged the dominant laissez
faire doctrine that governed economic thinking and argued that the
new social sciences provided evidence that “science and the ideal of
24
human brotherhood were complementary.”
At the time,
economist Richard T. Ely argued that “the widening and
deepening range of ethical obligations rests upon the basis of solid
25
facts.”
These university scholars grew in importance as the
progressive movements grew in power. They offered European
solutions to social difficulties, including, especially, advocating the
German notion that the state could be an instrument of social
26
change.
In his essay The Origins of Progressivism, Stanley P. Caine
outlines numerous other influences and tensions that lead to the
Progressive Era—many of which stem from decades before the
reformist spirit took hold. Among them was the strength of
27
populism and its counter-force, the mugwumps, who “mourned
the absence of character, breeding, and the ideas that had
28
characterized American society in an earlier era.” Additionally,
29
the economic crises of the 1890s influenced many, including the
muckraking journalists that were essential to the Progressive Era.
Caine argues that the 1890s was “a decade in transition,” an
“indecisive” period that led to the more assertive progressive years
that followed. The combination of socialism, capitalism, and
30
populism intersected to form the “three categories” that Caine
concludes lay at the heart of progressivism: “more direct
democratic control over government, new forms of taxation to
eliminate privilege and assure more equitable distribution of
24. Id. at 16. See also infra Part IV for further discussion.
25. Caine, supra note 18, at 16.
26. For example, “[t]he settlement idea, the eight-hour day, public ownership
of utilities, public housing, unemployment insurance, and old-age pensions were
all tried first in Europe, then brought by progressives to America.” Id. at 17–18.
27. “Mugwumps” were Republicans who supported Democrat Grover
Cleveland in his 1884 presidential bid.
28. Caine, supra note 18, at 19.
29. Extensive newspaper and magazine coverage chronicled the economic
suffering of the time, such as the twenty percent unemployment rate and the
violent end to the Pullman walkout when twelve people died after President
Cleveland ordered federal troops to break the strike.
30. Populism is not an economic theory in the same category as socialism and
capitalism. However, as each of these theories carry within them presumed and
preferred political structures, as well as implications for political participation, it
seems reasonable to understand populism as a counter-force to the other two.
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society’s benefits, and the strict control (if not public ownership) of
31
In other words, although the Progressive Era is
monopolies.”
identified as roughly the first two decades of the twentieth century,
it must be understood as the continuation of political conflict that
significantly predates reformist political activism.
C. Historians on Progressivism
Historians’ descriptions of progressivism differ sharply, at least
in part because many who claimed to be progressive were only
pretending to be so, and because individual, business, and
collective interests all influenced and benefited from progressive
reforms. In the 1920s and 30s, historians described the Progressive
Era as “the successful culmination of a long just struggle by ‘the
32
people’ against big business.”
However, this ignored the vast
commercial and corporate benefits that resulted from progressive
causes; businesses continued to make money and corporations
continued to increase in size even when incorporating regulatory
33
changes.
In the 1950s, it was argued that progressivism was
partially responsible for American entry into World War I because
progressivism sought to “extend democracy and to prevent war
34
from occurring again,” but this too only tells part of the story.
Despite its socialist and populist roots, some historians argue
that progressivism was not a significant change in national outlook
at all. They argue that America has always lacked significant
ideological conflict since all Americans, liberal and conservative
35
alike, are disciples of John Locke.
Instead, they suggest,
progressives were merely “defenders of the genteel tradition . . .
defending Victorian beliefs in absolute morality, manners, and
36
culture from the new intellectual rebels.” However, this approach

31. Caine, supra note 18, at 31.
32. Anderson, supra note 17, at 427.
33. McCormick, supra note 14, at 251.
34. Anderson, supra note 17, at 430.
35. This is a questionable assertion. While it is true that American political
theory is largely Lockean, it is unclear that it is universally and solely so, especially
amongst those who seek reform. The pessimistic liberalism of Hobbes tends to
govern international relations, especially post September 11, 2001, and Rousseau’s
naturalism was likely an important element in nineteenth-century
transcendentalism. Furthermore, it is unclear whether adherence to Mill’s
account of liberty, for example, is a de facto adherence to Locke or simply Millian
in itself.
36. Anderson, supra note 17, at 437.
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runs afoul of what is likely the most dominant view. Famously, after
considering a variety of definitions of progressivism, Peter Filene
offered “An Obituary for ‘The Progressive Movement’”: “It is time
to tear off the familiar label [of progressivism] and, thus liberated
from its prejudice, see the history between 1890 and 1920 for what
it was—ambiguous, inconsistent, moved by agenda and forces more
37
complex than a progressive movement.”
A few years later,
however, Daniel Rodgers labels Filene’s approach “a pluralistic
reading of progressive politics,” and declares it simply another
38
questionable interpretation.
D. Contemporary Issues in Progressive Theory
As ought to be clear, what it means to be progressive, at least
historically, is very much a muddle. Whereas contemporary
progressive attitudes seem, at first blush, to be more focused, one
cannot help notice that even today’s progressives neglect to offer a
coherent account of their core philosophy: the term progressive
remains undefined. This lack of definition is only further
complicated by progressivism’s de facto role as the opposition to the
contemporary mainstream; progressivism is identified more often
by what it is not than by what it is. For example, Roberto
Mangabeira Unger and Cornel West, in a 1998 article in The Nation
titled “Progressive Politics and What Lies Ahead,” call for an
“institutional experimentalism,” the purpose of which is to counter
the “rigid ideological grids” of past progressivism that “overlook the
39
complexity and experimental impulse of American life.”
It is
unclear what rigidity they refer to, although they likely mean the
unwillingness to compromise that many would suggest
40
characterizes the left.
Once again, West and Unger never define the progressive
outlook. The closest they come is their observation that
progressives, if not yet many of their fellow Americans, see
problems with how money and moneyed interests exert an

37. Peter G. Filene, An Obituary for “The Progressive Movement”, 22 AM. Q. 20, 34
(1970).
38. Daniel T. Rodgers, In Search of Progressivism, 10 REV. AM. HIST. 113, 114
(1982).
39. Roberto Mangabeira Unger & Cornel West, Progressive Politics and What
Lies Ahead, THE NATION, Nov. 23, 1998, at 11.
40. It was precisely his willingness to compromise that made many on the left
dissatisfied with President Bill Clinton.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006

9

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 1
1. WEINSTEIN - RC.DOC

10

11/21/2006 12:37:10 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:1

inordinate influence upon the outcome of elections and
the direction of policy, an influence occasionally
sanctified by the judiciary as if the ability of money to talk,
magnifying the voices of the few, crowding out the voices
41
of the many, were a principle rather than a wrong.
This description echoes some of the progressive assertions of
the early twentieth century: the corrupting influence of money and
big business on American politics and the exclusion of individual
non-moneyed voices in the political process. More regulation and
more grassroots participation is once again the clarion call of the
progressive.
For our purposes, it is worth investigating progressivism in a
legal context as well. Many of Unger and West’s sentiments are
shared by David Kairys in his introduction to the revised edition of
42
The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique. Once again, offering no
clear definition what it means to be progressive, Kairys
43
distinguishes his approach from “traditional jurisprudence” and
44
“mainstream legal thought,” hoping to locate his method in
45
opposition to the methodology of legal adjudication and research.
Kairys first attacks the idealized decision-making process that
governs the establishment and practice of law. Second, he calls for
democratic reform to allow for more popular participation in
political decision making, particularly in those decisions that affect
the courts. Third, he rejects the notion that either the law or the
state are “neutral, value-free arbiters, independent of and
unaffected by social and economic relations, political forces and
46
cultural phenomena.” Fourth, he calls for a reexamination of the
legitimization function for law, arguing that “the law’s ultimate
mechanism for control and enforcement is institutional violence,
but it protects the dominant system of social and power relations
47
against political and ideological as well as physical challenges.”
Kairys’ rich and interesting discussion shares with Unger and
West’s article numerous themes that have been passed on from the
earlier twentieth-century progressives: the passion for reform, the
41. Unger & West, supra note 39, at 12.
42. DAVID KAIRYS, Introduction to THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE
1 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990).
43. Id. at 9.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 6.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 7.
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call for a more direct democracy, the appeal of populism, and an
understanding of the political and legal process as the adjudication
48
of disputes among particular competing groups.
Yet Kairys’
introduction adds a few new themes to the mix. In particular, his
rejection of abstract contextless procedure and his attack on the
(in Kairys’ view) false claim of political neutrality that characterizes
49
legal and political procedure.
In many ways, these two new critiques are extensions of the
older concerns. A political procedure that adjudicates between
groups cannot be neutral; it must look at the particulars of
circumstance. Furthermore, any reformist movement cannot be
purely theoretical. It must look at actual circumstances and
determine how to convert institutions from one form to another.
The remainder of this essay will examine these and several
other progressive themes in themselves. Rather than continue the
historical focus of this first section, I shift to a philosophical
investigation of the meaning of neutrality and group relations, and
of the relationship between morality and the free market.
However, I shall begin with the proverbial elephant in the room:
the concept of progress itself.
II. THE CONCEPT OF PROGRESS
A. Worldviews Before “Progress”
Progress as it is currently understood is primarily an
enlightenment concept. Throughout most of the human
experience, people regarded history as either static or cyclical.
Parents expected their children’s lives to be very much like their
own, and basic knowledge remained the same over many
generations. The archetypical modern experience of children
rejecting their parents’ attitudes as naïve, inadequate, or corrupt is
the product of a rapidly changing world; it is not human nature
manifested through inevitable adolescent rebellion.
When radical change did take place, it was usually viewed as
the result of accident, the consequence of a particular political will,
or the effect of intervention by a divine figure. In fact, change,
when it did occur, was more apt to be seen as regressive than

48.
49.

See id. at 1–7.
See id.
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progressive; things got worse, not better. The expulsion from Eden
is a primary example of a story glorifying an unsullied past. Every
day takes people farther away from perfection, this worldview tells
us, and redemption is only possible outside the confines of human
history. One may be redeemed in the afterlife, but in nature, the
will fails, the body deteriorates, and human society collapses.
Classical Greek thought also assumed the degeneration of
human society. The Greeks spoke of a Golden Age, a time without
strife or toil. Hesiod described history as moving from the age of
gold to the age of iron; Plato saw society as degenerating along
political organizational lines—from aristocracy, to timocracy,
50
oligarchy, democracy, and then, ultimately, despotism. Aristotle
suggested that human nature was stagnant if not wicked, and that
51
change in the political order in itself was undesirable. The Greeks
saw society is a fragile bulwark against chaos.
B. The Earliest Uses of the Term
The word progress is etymologically Latin, a combination of
pro and gradi. Literally, it means to walk forward. The first use of
the term is likely by Lucretius in De Rerum Natura. In his
description of humans distinguishing themselves over time from
the beasts of nature, he writes: “practice and the experience of the
unresisting mind have taught mankind as they have progressed
52
from point to point.”
For the Roman poet, however, growth is no more; we may have
progressed but we do not progress any longer. As far as Lucretius
was concerned, whatever advancement humanity had managed was
already complete. Only the possibility of destruction was ever
53
present. Progress, which contemporary minds understand as a
continuous movement forward that provides society and inquiry
with direction, was absent from his picture of the future.
This is not to suggest that contemporary visions of progress
must offer a narrative that is uninterrupted, without temporary
setbacks, or that is absolutely secure. Instead, progress can be
complicated and is often fragile. The twentieth century is a prime
50. Plato, The Republic, Book VIII.
51. Aristotle, Politics, Book II.
52. Sidney B. Fay, The Idea of Progress, 52 AM. HIST. REV. 231, 234 (1947)
(quoting TITUS LUCRETIUS CARUS, DE RERUM NATURA, Book V, ll., 1452–53 (H.A.J.
Munro ed., London 1920)).
53. James H.S. Bossard, The Concept of Progress, 10 SOC. FORCES 5, 6 (1931).
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example of a time fraught with unlearned lessons and rife with
degeneration, but one could certainly make the case that
significant progress was made in the midst of the century’s horrors.
During times of significant growth and complexity, progress
can be particularly hard to spot. As Willson H. Coates writes:
“Since there has always been in periods of rapid social change a
dual process of breaking down and building up, it is possible to
regard the disintegration of moral and social traditions as a
necessary part of the moral and social reconstruction which the
54
twentieth century demands.”
In other words, despite the
destruction of institutions and the chaos and barbarism of the
twentieth century, a bird’s eye view—perhaps the only view that
permits an unfettered glimpse of progress—allows one to see
advancement: “Progress may be no less progress for its being
precarious, for it has never been, and by definition can never be,
55
identified with stasis.”
The intellectual shift leading to the contemporary concept of
progress began during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
with the introduction of the modern scientific method and
attitude. Science assumed predictability and coherent explanation.
To describe nature was to describe logos: “man had to see that it was
56
not fortune but general causes that govern the world.”
In 1566, for example, Jean Bodin argued against the classical
image of a golden age. Summing up Bodin’s argument, Sidney B.
Fay said: “the powers of nature have always remained the same; and
. . . it would be illogical to suppose that nature could at one time
produce the men and conditions postulated by the Golden Age
57
theory, and not produce them at a later time.” Bodin argued that
it is human attitudes and experiences that fluctuate over time:
History . . . depends largely on the will of men, which is
always changing: every day new customs, new laws, new
institutions come into being, and also new errors,
resulting in a series of oscillations. Rise is followed by fall,
and fall by rise. But, on the whole, through the series of
oscillations, there has been a gradual ascent from the time
when men lived like wild beasts to the social order of

54.
55.
56.
57.

Willson H. Coates, What is Progress?, 45 J. PHIL. 67, 69 (1948).
Id. at 71.
Bossard, supra note 53, at 8.
Fay, supra note 52, at 235.
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58

sixteenth century Europe.
This approach to nature is preeminently modern: the laws of
nature are timeless, and, as such, different outcomes are the result
of human intervention, not a fluctuating physics. Yet, like
Lucretius, Bodin paid little attention to the future. The
development that he described was the progress that led to his age,
not from it. It would be another sixty years before Francis Bacon
would introduce the teleological optimism of the modern scientific
method: explication of the gradual and intentional forward
movement that is necessary to overcome human error in its four
59
Bacon’s systematic account of an error-free
dominant forms.
empiricism recognizes that scientific knowledge was not complete
60
when it articulated all that was currently known.
Bacon writes of scientific revolutions and of knowledge beyond
the imagination of his contemporaries, familiar tools of progress to
the modern mind. However, the New Atlantis was postulated by
Bacon as being physically and not temporally far away from the
61
England that he knew. Bacon, along with Bodin, was irrevocably
attached to the classical texts as authorities, and both thinkers
preserved the place of providence in the unfolding of historical
62
events. None of these attitudes jibe with contemporary notions of
progress.
It was Descartes who detached modern scientific thinking from
58.
59.

Id.
Francis Bacon, Novum Organum, in 30 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN
WORLD 107 (Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1952) (1620). Bacon classified errors
as stemming from four sources, he terms them idols. They are: Idols of the Cave,
limitations of any given individual caused by experience, culture, or allegiances to
ideologies or false systems; Idols of the Tribe, imperfections in human nature such
as the unreliability of the senses; Idols of the Marketplace, mistakes caused by
interaction with others, specifically resulting from the limitations of language; and,
Idols of the Theater, similar to the Idols of the Cave, errors caused by complex
systems that inaccurately mimic the truth.
Here he had in mind false
philosophical systems.
60. Id. Building off of recent discoveries, he writes: “There is therefore much
ground for hoping that there are still laid up in the womb of nature many secrets
of excellent use, having no affinity or parallelism with anything that is now known,
but lying entirely out of the beat of the imagination, which have not yet been
found out. They too no doubt will some time or other, in the course and
revolution of many ages, come to light of themselves, just as the others did; only by
the method of which we are now treating they can be speedily and suddenly and
simultaneously presented and anticipated.” Id. at 128–29.
61. Rush Welter, The Idea of Progress in America: An Essay in Ideas and Method,
16 J. HIST. IDEAS 401, 402 (1955).
62. Fay, supra note 52, at 235.
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63

the authority of the classics.
His famous foundationalism
permitted each inquirer to reach the moment of the indubitable.
Cogito Ergo Sum was as much a break from the past as it was the
reaffirmation of science as he understood it. One did not need
Aristotle to establish certainty; one needed only the rationality
present in all mature minds. Descartes provided the contemporary
world with intellectual tools that functioned independently of the
divine. His famous Meditations on First Philosophy provides a
universally accessible foundation for scientific knowledge that
allows individuals to collectively build, free of doubt, on the
discoveries of others. Purely rational inquiry can, for Descartes, be
free from error, and the sciences can therefore be regarded as a
64
reliable source of increasing knowledge.
Consider, in summation, the following account of the
historical prerequisites for the concept of progress:
First to appear was a monistic and synthetic view of
history, as opposed to that cyclical view which had
characterized late Greek and Roman thought; this was
provided by the Hebraic and Christian assumption of a
long-range meaning and direction in historic change.
Second of these prerequisites to appear was a willingness
after the first flush of Renaissance classicism to turn to
natural facts rather than ancient classics for an
understanding of the contemporary world; in times such a
willingness would imply that the present world was quite
as important as the past, and might even have progressed
beyond it in knowledge. A third factor, also a function of
the Renaissance, was secularization of thought, which
would ultimately enable men to break free of the
Christian view of history so far as it tended to deprecate
progress in this world in favor of that to be achieved by
transition to another. Coupled with it was a growing
belief in the immutable laws of nature, which by
definition excluded the arbitrary workings of a divine
63. See Rene Descartes, Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason,
in 31 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 41 (Elizabeth S. Haldane & G.R.T.
Ross trans., Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 1952) (1637) [hereinafter Descartes,
Discourse on Method]; Rene Descartes, Meditation on First Philosophy, in 31 GREAT
BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 69 (Elizabeth S. Haldane & G.R.T. Ross trans.,
Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 1952) (1641) [hereinafter Descartes, Meditation].
64. Descartes, Meditations, supra note 63, at 75–81. It is therefore quite
appropriate, as Fay reminds us, that Descartes’s Discourse on Method was originally
titled “The Project of a Universal Science Which Can Elevate Our Nature to its
Highest Perfection.” Fay, supra note 52, at 235.
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Providence from the course of historic development, and
thus made progress if it existed at all implicit in history
65
itself.
C. The Eighteenth Century Conception of Progress
Progress is not a simple idea. It requires a background culture
and a network of social, epistemological, and metaphysical
assumptions that provide explanations of the human place in the
world, the nature and limits of inquiry, the role (or lack thereof) of
the divine, and, of course, a complex and sophisticated account of
the nature of history itself.
It also requires background
conceptions of justice and the good life in that a history that
progresses must progress towards something. The Enlightenment
66
identified what that something might be.
For eighteenth-century thinkers, beginning with the influential
writings of Turgot and Condorcet, progress includes social,
political, and moral components.
It was not just scientific
knowledge that advanced as history unfolded.
The human
character and circumstance bettered itself. In A Philosophical Review
of the Successive Advances of the Human Mind, Turgot postulated that
human society moved back and forth from barbarism to
civilization, the latter being characterized by the centrality of
reason while the former is more closely identified with thought
67
governed by superstition. While still cyclical, in a certain sense,
Turgot contributes a stage theory that will be of immense
importance to Adam Smith and his commentators (especially
Marx), and supplies the essential notion that one stage can be
identified as morally better than another. Without such gradations,
progress becomes indistinguishable from chronology.
The
teleology inherent in the advancement of history assumes that the
closer one gets to the goal of history, the higher the moral value of
the current moment is.
Ultimately, though, is it the Marquis de Condorcet who offers

65. Welter, supra note 61, at 401–02 (citing J.B. BURY, THE IDEA OF PROGRESS:
AN INQUIRY INTO ITS ORIGIN AND GROWTH (1920)).
66. It is worth interjecting that even this essay presumes that a description of
progress in terms of progression is the most informative means of communicating
the narrative of meaning behind a specific concept.
67. A. R. J. Turgot, Second discours en Sorbonne. Sur les progrès successifs
de l'esprit humain, in 2 ŒUVRES DE TURGOT 597–611 (Eugène Daire & Hippolyte
Dussard eds., Guillaumin Libraire 1844) (1750).
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us the most dramatic account of moral progress, placing its
identification at the center of his treatise, The Progress of the Human
Mind. The “aim” of this work, he writes, is to show that “nature has
set no term to the perfection of the human faculties; that the
perfection of man is truly indefinite; and that the progress of this
perfectibility, from now onwards independent of any power that
may wish to halt it, has no other limit than the duration of the
globe upon which nature has cast us. This progress will no doubt
68
vary in speed, but it will never be reversed.”
Condorcet’s comment that progress can never be retrograde
makes explicit its adherence to the principles of nature. It is not
simply that forward movement describes the execution of these
principles. Progress is itself one of the principles; that the human
mind progresses is part of its nature.
The concept of “progress”—as it developed through the
Enlightenment—is collective in two important ways. The first is
that these thinkers refer to progress as a monolithic activity: either
humanity progresses or it does not. There is not any room for
more sophisticated claims such as, “humanity has progressed in its
respect for the individual person, but it has not progressed in its
69
attitude towards women.”
The second way in which progress is collective is more
troubling for the American progressive agenda.
Humanity
70
progresses as a whole, but individuals might not.
One might
suggest that the human condition has bettered significantly—
humans now have the technological capacity for shelter, advanced
medicine, and high-speed communication—but that does not
68. ANTOINE-NICOLAS DE CONDORCET, SKETCH FOR A HISTORICAL PICTURE OF
THE PROGRESS OF THE HUMAN MIND 4 (June Barraclough trans., Weidenfeld &
Nicolson 1955) (1795).
69. This inadequacy would correct itself in the beginning of the twentieth
century during which progress’s “concrete application and its decentralization . . .
[were identified] with differing kinds of change.” Bossard, supra note 53, at 11.
Given two world wars, the depression, and the failure of the League of Nations,
“civilization seemed to be turned back several centuries.” Fay, supra note 52, at
240. There was a renewed sense of allegiance to Turgot’s cycle-theory of progress,
and “more attention was focused on the stages where [history] halted or slipped
back.” Id. Science seemed to advance significantly while morality seemed to
degenerate. Progress had to be compartmentalized.
70. This is not to suggest that education cannot make a person morally
better; such a concept was central to many Enlightenment thinkers’ systems.
Furthermore, in the nineteenth century, Hegel would argue that certain “world
historical” individuals (Alexander the Great, Napoleon, etc.) do move history
forward.
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mean that even the majority of people actually see the benefits of
these advances. Vast numbers of people have no access to shelter,
medicine, or the technologies of communication, and, as such, the
forward progress of those who do might actually make them worse
71
off rather than better.
Immanuel Kant, the paradigmatic
enlightenment philosopher and the philosophical progenitor of
not only the dominant contemporary political theory, but also the
role of subjectivity in the modern experience, will help us to focus
72
on this notion of collectivity in more detail.
D. Kant on History and Progress
In An Answer to the Question “What is Enlightenment?”, Kant
identifies the purpose of human history as enlightenment, or
73
According to
“man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage.”
Kant, the motto of enlightenment is “Sapere aude! [Dare to know]”
74
or, “Have courage to use your own reason!” Reason is the key to
freedom, although freedom is limited in the Kantian sense. It is
not Isaiah Berlin’s liberty, but rather, “the public use of one’s
reason.”
According to Kant, “it alone can bring about
75
enlightenment among men.”
For Kant, freedom is scholarly. It denotes the ability to
criticize when one speaks in one’s own voice, but does not entitle a
person to speak critically when he or she represents a particular
76
office. For example, a clergyman must teach catechism on the
pulpit even if he works as a scholar to challenge the doctrine via
77
theological journals. For Kant, to deny this scholarly freedom is
71. See infra Parts III and IV.
72. This requires some explanation. As we will see in section three, Kant’s
moral and political theories lie at the core of contemporary liberal political
philosophy, the most influential proponent of which is John Rawls. In a related
but different area, Kant is largely responsible for the subjective turn in modern
epistemology. Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason argues that the mind actively filters
information in order to understand it. This subjectivism is a radical departure
from the epistemologists who came before him.
73. Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question “What is Enlightenment?, in ON
HISTORY 3, 3 (Lewis White Beck ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc. 1963) (1784).
74. Id. at 3.
75. Id. at 5.
76. This may not seem like much, but in fact, in contemporary politics, we are
often in danger of losing this freedom. For example, corporate officials are often
restricted from making political statements because even if they disavow
association with their employers, the risk of associating a particular company with
a controversial position is too great.
77. Kant, supra note 73, at 6.
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to bind people to the present time. It is “to shut off all further
enlightenment from the human race,” and is “a crime against
humanity,” because “the proper destination . . . [of humanity] . . .
78
lies precisely in this progress.” Kant adds by way of explanation:
“For himself (and only for a short time) a man may postpone
enlightenment in what he ought to know, but to renounce it for
79
posterity is to injure and trample on the rights of mankind.”
Thus, we have a duty to pursue our own improvement, not for
ourselves, but for its universal importance. Each of us is a
80
contributor to the human project. The nature and limitations of
this contribution are elaborated upon in his Idea for a Universal
81
History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View, published the same year.
He explains:
Whatever concept one may hold, from a metaphysical
point of view, concerning the freedom of the will,
certainly its appearances, which are human actions, like
every other natural event are determined by universal
laws. However obscure their causes, history, which is
concerned with narrating these appearances, permits us
to hope that if we attend to the play of freedom of the
human will in the large, we may be able to discern a
regular movement in it, and that what seems complex and
chaotic in the single individual may be seen from the
78. Id. at 6–8.
79. Id. at 8.
80. Kant concludes the essay by writing,
But only one who is himself enlightened, is not afraid of shadows, and
has a numerous and well-disciplined army to assure public peace, can say:
“Argue as much as you will, and about what you will, only obey!” A
republic could not dare say such a thing. Here is shown a strange and
unexpected trend in human affairs in which almost everything, looked at
in the large, is paradoxical. A greater degree of civil freedom appears
advantageous to the freedom of mind of the people, and yet it places
inescapable limitations upon it. A lower degree of civil freedom, on the
contrary, provides the mind with room for each man to extend himself to
his full capacity. As nature has uncovered from under this hard shell the
seed for which she most tenderly cares—the propensity and vocation to
free thinking—this gradually works back upon the character of the
people, who thereby gradually become capable of managing freedom;
finally, it affects the principles of government, which finds it to its
advantage to treat men, who are now more than machines, in accordance
with their dignity.
Id. at 10.
81. Immanuel Kant, Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of
View, in ON HISTORY 11 (Lewis White Black ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc. 1963)
(1784).
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standpoint of the human race as a whole to be a steady
and progressive though slow evolution of its original
82
endowment.
The essay on cosmopolitan history consists of nine theses
describing the relationship between human action and history, and
includes elaborations on their meaning. Ultimately, the theses lead
to the goal of nature, which is “the achievement of a universal civic
83
This is “the most
society which administers law among men.”
84
difficult and the last [problem] to be solved by mankind”:
The history of mankind can be seen, in the large, as the
realization of Nature’s secret plan to bring forth a
perfectly constituted state as the only condition in which
the capacities of mankind can be fully developed, and also
bring forth that external relation among states which is
85
perfectly adequate to this end.
The relevant difficulty for our discussion lies in the second
thesis: “In man (as the only rational creature on earth) those
natural capacities which are directed to the use of his reason are to
86
be fully developed only in the race, not in the individual.” Kant
argues that reason itself progresses, but because it:
requires trial, practice, and instruction in order gradually
to progress from one level of insight to another . . . a
single man would have to live excessively long in order to
learn to make full use of all his natural capacities. Since
Nature has set only a short period for his life, she needs a
perhaps unreckonable series of generations, each of
which passes its own enlightenment to its successor in
order finally to bring the seeds of enlightenment to that
degree of development in our race which is completely
87
suitable to Nature’s purpose.
This, in a nutshell, is the modern conception of progress.
Each generation contributes to the progress of the whole by being
one link in a chain. While individuals may experience the fruit of
improvement along the way, they will never achieve the telos that
drives progress.
On its own, this seems optimistic, but more detail reveals the
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 11.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 13.
Id.
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tension implicit in the procedure Kant outlines: it is human
antagonism that drives history forward. Humans have both social
and unsocial elements in their personalities. A person wants to be
in society “because in society he feels himself to be more than man,
88
i.e., as more than the developed form of his natural capacities.”
Yet, at the same time, a person wants to be alone, “because he finds
in himself at the same time the unsocial characteristic of wishing to
89
have everything go according to his own wish.” Humans therefore
live in conflict with one another, negotiating, as Berlin would later
call it, their freedom from others and their freedom to
actualization that can only occur in social circumstances. Kant’s
vision is nowhere as extreme as Hobbes’s war of all against all;
90
nevertheless, the human experience is still one of opposition.
Again, we see the modern notion of progress. Conflict and
individual desires bring improvement because the competition for
goods and the tension between individuals are the means by which
individuals improve their powers. This improvement moves the
human race forward. Particular people win or lose, but collectively,
history ensures that the human race wins overall.
E. Progress During and After the Nineteenth Century
For Kant, progress contributes to the realization of human
potential. At the core of his account is a glorification of the human
capacity. Enlightenment for Kant is the point where humankind
can finally do whatever it was that it was intended to do.
88. Id. at 15.
89. Id.
90. Kant writes:
This opposition it is which awakens all his powers, brings him to conquer
his inclination to laziness and, propelled by vainglory, lust for power, and
avarice, to achieve a rank among his fellows whom he cannot tolerate but
from whom he cannot withdraw. Thus are taken the first true steps from
barbarism to culture, which consists in the social worth of man; thence
gradually develop all talents, and taste is refined; through continued
enlightenment the beginnings are laid for a way of thought which can in
time convert the coarse, natural disposition for moral discrimination into
definite practical principles, and thereby change a society of men driven
together by their natural feelings into a moral whole . . . . Thanks be to
Nature, then, for the incompatibility, for heartless competitive vanity, for
the insatiable desire to possess and to rule! Without them, all the
excellent natural capacities of humanity would forever sleep,
undeveloped. Man wishes concord; but Nature knows better what is
good for the race; she wills discord.
Id. at 15–16.
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Nineteenth-century theorists modified this meaning. For Hegel,
historical progress is aimed at achieving freedom, but his
conception of freedom is inherently tied together with access to
truth, universal culture, and political and metaphysical identity.
The end of history for Hegel is Absolute Spirit: collective selfactualization, self-aware total knowledge of the whole as a
91
collectivity.
Marx would challenge Hegel, arguing that his forerunner’s
conception of freedom did little for the individual and that his
conception of history was so focused on principle that it ignored
92
He would substitute communism—political
particular events.
equality, universal political participation, and true command of
one’s own labor—for Kant’s enlightenment. John Stuart Mill
would emphasize a different area of Kant’s essay, arguing that
93
political liberty is necessary for free inquiry. Darwin’s biological
theories would weave the notion of progress into even the
seemingly accidental (he provides the security of providence
without the necessity of the divine: we are, by nature, a species that
advances).
The pragmatists—C.S. Pierce, John Dewey, and
others—would develop a progressivist theory of truth that defined
truth in part as that which the community of inquiry would
94
converge upon in the long run.
All of these variations on Kant and his commentators, and on
Condorcet, Smith, and Turgot, become elements within the
negotiations of the American Progressive Era. In The Idea of Progress
in America, Rush Welter shows clearly that in America, during the
nineteenth century, “both ‘conservatives’ and ‘liberals’ subscribed
to the doctrine of a systematic and presumably perpetual

91. Hegel, as an idealist, saw reason as the ultimate reality, so physical
distinction between individuals were of lesser concern in his system. At most, he
was concerned about the interaction of peoples—nations the interaction of which
drove history forward.
92. See Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in THE
MARX-ENGELS READER (Robert C. Tucker ed., W.W. Norton & Company Inc. 2d ed.
1978) (1844).
93. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 75–118 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed.,
Penguin Books 1974) (1859).
94. Herbert Spencer would “identify progress with evolution. Organic
evolution is organized progress and the law of organic progress is the law of all
progress.” Bossard, supra note 53, at 9. Spencer extended “‘the survival of the
fittest’ to biology, psychology, sociology, and ethics,” creating “the gigantic
Synthetic Philosophy which was to explain the development of the universe.” Fay,
supra note 52, at 237.
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improvement of the human estate,” but that there was significant
satisfaction in the way things were: “progress . . . would be a
95
continuation of the present.”
As Welter explains, during that
period, almost universally, for Americans, “the United States . . .
96
both had progressed and was progress.” Yet, at the same time,
97
Americans regarded their nation as “an experiment.”
They
appreciated change, but wanted it “orderly,” against the
98
revolutionary roots of the experiment itself.
Before the Progressive Era, then, Americans rejected Kant’s
presumption of conflict:
On the classic European view, the conflict of opinions
produce truth; in the light of the idea of progress truth
will be constantly accruing new meanings. But in the
United States neither conflict nor innovation was deemed
necessary. Indeed all that was necessary, according to a
commonly held view, was the education of all children in
99
the accepted truths of their parents.
As we saw in the first section, this approach changed in the
Progressive Era, and many of these tensions can be witnessed in the
conflict between the different reformists that epitomized the
period. If society is made up of different groups, every group
might not be as capable of teaching the dominant values, values
that are no longer universally agreed upon. Instead, groups must
fight for their values to be realized and they may therefore have to
rely on the government to protect their ability to do so.
Contemporary progressives are still struggling with these
nuances, especially the tension between the collective nature of
progress and the need for advancement of the individual. What
makes a collective and how close to the individual person do the
benefits of progress penetrate? Is collectivity economic, ethnic,
religious, or gendered? Are the needs of an individual group
member subordinate to the needs of the group in general? To
what extent can the law address social realities? These issues, as we
have seen, are touched upon in Kairys’ introduction to The Politics
of Law: A Progressive Critique. They become some of the central foci
of American politics during the second half of the twentieth
95. Rush Welter, The Idea of Progress in America: An Essay in Ideas and Method,
16 J. HIST. IDEAS 401, 401, 404 (1955).
96. Id. at 406.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 410.
99. Id. at 413.
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century.
III. CONTEXT AND BUREAUCRACY
In this section, I focus on the use of an ideal as a guiding force
in progressive politics. As we have seen, in the introduction to The
Politics of Law, David Kairys attacks the idealized decision-making
process that governs the establishment and practice of law. He
questions whether the state can ever be neutral or value-free, with a
legal system independent of social, political, economic, or cultural
forces. Progressives, it seems, regard individual circumstance as
relevant to political decision making, and they acknowledge that
the current political structure and its inequities affect these
decisions.
The playing field is not equal, a contemporary
progressive would likely argue, and since this inequality influences
public and legal policy, one can fairly question the legitimacy of the
current legal system.
The fact that money and special interests significantly
influence American governance is so widely accepted that
100
commenting on it has reached the level of platitude.
Kairys’
concerns cut deeper. He asks, not only whether finance affects
realpolitik, but whether social and economic inequalities are
interwoven into the very core of the American vision of justice.
Does ignoring particularities subvert the pursuit of justice at the
outset?
A. John Rawls’s Proceduralism
Kairys’ concerns are shared by many in political philosophy,
and his comments contribute to a debate that has reached its
zenith in the last thirty years. At the epicenter of this discussion lies
the work of the late Harvard Professor John Rawls, whose 1971
101
book A Theory of Justice renewed interest in political philosophy,
moving it from a stagnant sub-field to perhaps the most active and
vibrant area of philosophy today. The contrast between Rawls’s two
102
most important books highlights precisely what any legal system

100. At the same time, there is a parallel grassroots movement aimed at
circumventing this control of business. The internet-based political action group
MoveOn.org is, perhaps, the most successful.
101. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999) (1971).
102. I have in mind Rawls’s A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism. See
generally id.; JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (paperback ed. 1996).
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gains or loses by prioritizing neutrality and an idealized reasoning
structure, factors that we must consider if we are to take Kairys’
critique seriously.
Rawls is a proceduralist. In other words, he believes that
focusing on the process of governing rather than the people who
are to be governed is the best way to treat individuals equally. This
is an outgrowth of Kant’s claim that only ethical precepts which
consider reason alone are truly moral. Categorical principles reach
universal conclusions, and if one’s act is moral in all circumstances,
103
it is moral in any circumstance.
When a political system is built in accordance with the
categorical imperative, as Kant famously calls it, moral agents enter
into membership in the Kingdom of Ends: a just political structure
that treats its members as ends-in-themselves.
In more
contemporary terms, systems of justice that follow Kant’s model
articulate rights and duties that apply to all people in all situations
so that they can be equally and justly applied to individual people
in specific circumstances. Each person, therefore, is politically
equal to every other and fully consenting and participatory in the
governance process.
Rawls struggled with all of this as early as 1958. In his groundbreaking paper Justice as Fairness, he considers justice, not as “a
virtue of particular persons” but rather, as a “virtue of social
104
institutions.” He writes that principles of justice “are regarded as
formulating restrictions as to how practices may define positions
and offices, and assign thereto powers and liabilities, rights and
105
duties.”
In philosophical terms, Rawls prioritizes the right over
the good, or the legal process over both people’s particular aims in
life and the state’s notion of what makes a good person. Despite its
106
liberal character, the institution comes first, and the individual

103. According to Kant, all people, by nature of their own reason, can assent
to a universal moral rule. In doing so, they act out of duty rather than simple
inclination, and, in return, they are treated with equal and absolute respect (but
even if they were not, Kant would argue, moral actors are still morally obligated to
follow the rule since it is the right thing to do).
104. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, in COLLECTED PAPERS 47–48 (Samuel
Freeman ed., 1999).
105. Id.
106. The term liberal, unless otherwise indicated, refers to the classical liberal
tradition: a society is liberal if it prioritizes the individual over the collective and
preserves an area of human life that cannot be infringed upon by the state. In
American politics, both Democrats and Republicans are liberal in this sense.
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107

later. As he wrote almost half a century later, “[n]either political
philosophy nor justice as fairness is . . . applied moral
108
philosophy.”
For Rawls, to understand what people want to be,
one must first understand the institutions that enumerate their
possibilities. Freedom is first and foremost access; liberty is
primarily institutional possibility. Like the progressives, Rawls sees
government intervention as a key to individual liberty.
Rawls’s words are representative of their time. Whatever he
meant by individuality and personal freedom was mired in a world
whose politics were about to change. Immersed in the cold war,
political philosophy of the 1950s was informed by World War II,
McCarthyism, and the Korean War. Rawls’s essay does not
109
anticipate the cultural conflict that would soon refocus his ideas.
B. Bureaucracy in A Theory of Justice
By 1971, Rawls made identity conflict a central component in
his work. He was seeking, along with many in the United States, a
mechanism for erasing racial and ethnic politics from political
110
In Theory, he presents a full-scale
decision-making procedures.
proceduralist conception of justice, one in which the proper
functioning of institutions guarantees both just circumstances and
necessary access to good.
For Rawls, the key to justice is found in the formation of the
political structure. He argues that the rules of justice—the
principles that outline the goals and structures of political
institutions—ought to be decided upon in a situation of total
fairness, otherwise the principles themselves will be inherently
107. In Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Rawls offers two reasons for his
prioritizing the “basic structure” of institutions. See JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS
FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (Erin Kelly ed., 2001). First, because political theory
needs, “an institutional division of labor between principles required to preserve
background justice and principles that apply directly to particular transactions
between individuals and associations,” id. at 54; and, second, because of its
“profound and pervasive influence on the persons who live under its institutions.”
Id. at 55.
108. Id. at 14.
109. The civil rights movement, the sexual revolution, the construction of the
Berlin Wall, and the mainstreaming of ethnic studies may possibly have been in
the air in the 1950’s, but they were far from being realized. They are, however,
essential to A Theory of Justice.
110. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1999) (chapter 2, “The
Feminist Critique of Liberalism,” is particularly relevant to this point). Whether
Rawls is fully conscious of gender difference is a matter of debate.
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corrupt; he is trying to avoid criticisms of the sort Kairys puts forth
from the start.
Building on the social contract tradition and adding elements
from Kant’s ethics, Rawls postulates a hypothetical ideal decisionmaking procedure called “the original position” in which all
interlocutors are placed under a “veil of ignorance” and are
therefore made unaware of their particular circumstances: they do
not know their own social status, abilities, ethnicities, genders,
111
capabilities, or personal aims.
Instead they are encouraged to
recognize that whatever the worst social position turns out to be,
they might end up being in it. For Rawls, only by being ignorant of
one’s own personal circumstance can one be truly impartial.
Without this ignorance, Rawls implies, people will necessarily
choose principles of justice that privilege their personal
circumstance.
Rawls argues that all people, so situated, will choose the same
principles of justice, the same claim Kant makes about the
categorical imperative. This ensures not only equal respect, but
universal consent. The agents in the original position are
essentially identical to one another and are adequate stand-ins for
those who do not participate, since any person can be placed in the
original position and will then consent to the same two
112
principles.
In other words, equal civil liberties cannot be
compromised and equal opportunity must be cultivated in all cases
unless their existence compromises the civil liberties established by
the first principle.
Rawls argues that in the original position, agents will
necessarily choose institutions in which the lowest rung is the most
beneficial of all possible lowest rungs; economic inequality is
permissible only insofar as the inequality contributes to the
increased well-being of the least fortunate. He calls this the
maximin principle, or the principle that seeks the maximum
113
minimum position. Despite the vast range of social difference in
111. RAWLS, supra note 101, at 17–22.
112. In order of priority, the principles of justice are:
(1) Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic
liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others. (2) Social and
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a)
reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to
positions and offices open to all.
Id. at 60.
113. Id. at 152. For example, imagine two societies, one egalitarian, one
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the hierarchical society, Rawls argues that agents in the original
position will still choose the hierarchical society because having the
lowest rung at position w+1 is better than having it at w. Upward
mobility is not an issue; neither is a sense of community, and Rawls
114
explicitly precludes envy as a motivating factor.
Rawls only
concerns himself with the worst-case scenario; he wants the worst
off as well off as possible. It is important to note that since no
economic concerns can trump the basic liberties guaranteed by the
first principle of justice, the concern that vast social inequalities will
result in a limitation on the ability of the least well-off members of
society to participate in governance is unfounded. Such limitations
would be regarded as interfering with the basic liberties and would
preclude that possibility of such a social arrangement from being
chosen by the members of the original position.
We see already how Rawls struggles with many of the themes
discussed by the progressives. He is concerned about the least welloff in society. Additionally, he is seeking a way for universal
participation in the formation of the principles of justice, yet he is
also wedded to seeking a means by which the collective can
intervene when regulation or intervention is required.
Perhaps the two most problematic issues in Rawls’s theory are
the ideal nature of the reasoning process and the aim for neutrality
between people. Taking the exact opposite position as Kairys,
Rawls concludes that true justice can only exist in circumstances
where the decision-making process governs each person precisely
as it would any other, while context is rejected as a relevant factor
in the establishment of the rules of justice. Since, according to
Rawls, ethnic, racial, or other such factors impair decision making,
he suggests that the only fair move is to exclude them from
115
consideration.
Such characteristics are accidental, not essential,
hierarchical. Suppose that the status of every member of the egalitarian society is
some level that I will call w, whereas the status of the members of the hierarchical
society ranges from level w+1 to level w+100. Here, w in this phrase means simply
wellness. I am using it as a composite for all those factors that influence quality of
life in a society. This includes economic well-being, health, happiness, etc. The
nature of wellness is controversial and I wish to avoid that discussion for the time
being. I only use this in an attempt to illustrate Rawls’s maximin principle.
114. Rawls writes, “the most extreme disparities in wealth and income are
allowed provided that the expectations of the least fortunate are raised to the
slightest degree. But at the same time similar inequalities favoring the more
advantaged are forbidden when those in the worst position lose by the least
amount.” RAWLS, supra note 101, at 157.
115. Id. at 137–42.
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in Rawls’s view of humanity, and are therefore irrelevant to political
decision making.
Of course, there is a major difference between Rawls’s
approach and Kairys’ approach; whereas the scholars in The Politics
of Law are working within a pre-existing and, perhaps, inherently
flawed system, Rawls is working to create a new system that once
established will hopefully avoid the flaws existent in our own.
Nevertheless, his critics argued that human rationality was simply
not possible in the original position, a criticism that echoes the
critiques of neutrality and ideality leveled against contemporary
legal procedure. People cannot make decisions about what
political circumstance is to be preferred if they have no sense of
116
their own identity or goals.
Reasoning requires a tradition and
strong sense of self to have rational justification, otherwise what
Rawls calls consent is really arbitrary preference.
C. Liberalism and Neutrality
The aftermath of A Theory of Justice is complicated (as is the
book, the surface of which I have only grazed here). Political
theorists either accepted Rawls’s framework or criticized it; they
could not ignore it. For our purposes, though, the most important
consequence is the prevalence of the concept of neutrality in
liberal theory, most precisely articulated by Ronald Dworkin in
1978 when he defined a liberal society as one in which
“government must be neutral on what might be called the question
117
of the good life.”
Dworkin used the term amidst a general defense of equality,
arguing that liberalism seeks to rectify the fact that “natural talents
118
are not distributed equally,” a notion he inherited from Rawls. In
other words, if one person is born smarter, stronger, or better
looking than another, then he or she cannot be said to deserve the
fruits of these talents. Just as group identification is not an
essential quality for Rawls, neither are talents. This is a problematic
116. See, e.g., ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1981); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE,
WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND
THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982). See also CHANDRAN KUKATHAS & PHILLIP PETTIT,
RAWLS: A THEORY OF JUSTICE AND ITS CRITICS (1990) (containing a useful overview
of Rawls’s theory and critiques of it).
117. Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 60, 64 (Michael
Sandel ed., 1984), originally published in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY (Stuart
Hampshire ed., 1978).
118. Id. at 68.
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notion for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that it
makes one wonder what counts as personhood after someone is
stripped of their most dominant characteristics. Dworkin’s insight
is Kantian in that it makes moral agents accountable for things that
they can control rather than the consequences of any particular act
or capacity. It also makes individuals morally relevant as rational
creatures alone.
The virtue of Dworkin’s essay was not simply that it was an
accurate portrayal of liberalism at the time, although it was. The
most important feature was his precise and clear execution of a
core and intuitive political idea. A good analytic, and a good
philosopher of law, Dworkin articulated clear and bounded
terminology upon which to center relevant discourse. His
argument was made well, with strong justification, and he thereby
provided an irresistible target for his critics. The main issue, it
turns out, is that his notion of neutrality is incoherent.
Put simply, for a government to remain neutral on
conceptions of the good life it must not take any position as to
whether one end is more valuable than another. Under liberalism,
this is a private matter. But the government must also protect its
citizens from others. Thus, the government must legislate against,
for example, murder. The prohibition of this act presumes,
however, that the good life is a life not prematurely ended by
another. At its absolute minimum, a liberal government must be
committed to protecting its citizens from unjustified violence, but if
119
so, the liberal government cannot be neutral.
At issue are the nature of neutrality and the priority of the
120
right and the good.
The role of neutrality was never dominant
until the late 1970s. Since Rawls and Dworkin, liberalism is
presumed to be neutral, and many liberals return to the priority of

119. It is worth adding, as William Galston does, that the commitment to
neutrality is itself not neutral; it is a substantial moral position. See WILLIAM A.
GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE
(1991) (emphasizing this point particularly in part three of the book). This is
Kairys’ insight as well, although The Politics of Law goes further to suggest that
neutrality might actually be harmful to the state and its people. See KAIRYS, supra
note 42, at 1–9.
120. These characteristics were originally used to describe certain aspects of
liberalism, but have tended to serve as an essentialist definition instead. Neutrality
was anticipated by Locke in his remarks on toleration, and the term was used once
by James Madison. See Richard C. Sinopoli, Liberalism and Contested Conceptions of
the Good: The Limits of Neutrality, 55 J. POL. 644, 646 (1993).
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121

the right over the good in one form or another.
D. The Later Rawls’s Limitation of Bureaucracy

Rawls’s response to this comes in his next book Political
122
Liberalism, in which he calls the term neutrality “unfortunate.”
Although Rawls himself regards the two books as consistent, his
assurances are unconvincing. In the latter work, and in apparent
response to claims that his conception of the political self was too
“thin” to provide an adequate foundation for deliberation, Rawls
removes the emphasis from the original position and rests his
123
theory on an “overlapping consensus.” He claims instead that the
original position was meant simply as a “device of representation,”
but in doing so, he shakes the normative foundation presented in A
124
Theory of Justice.
The original position offered an objective ideal
outside the political structure that provided guidance and direction
for public policy, but without this objective standard there are no
standards with which to judge the change.
The necessity of a standard is a key issue in any discussion of
progress, one that makes Sidney Fay suggest that the concept itself
125
is “logically meaningless.” There is nothing inherent in progress
itself that provides an end, Fay argues. If all that makes an end is
one person or group’s opinion, than one person’s progress may be
another person’s arbitrariness. This is why the enlightenment and
nineteenth-century philosophers tended to see progress in terms of
nature—a natural telos was normative, binding, and inherent in
121. See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE
(1980); CHARLES E. LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY (1987) (both works
defending forms of neutralist liberalism).
122. RAWLS, supra note 101, at 191.
123. Id. at 15, 39.
124. Id. at 24.
125. Fay writes:
Ideas, no matter whether true or false, are often potent factors in social
change. Ideas are also apt to reflect the color and pattern of an era. This
is notably true of the idea of progress—that “civilization has moved, is
moving, and will continue to move in a desirable direction.” It depends
on subjective value-judgments, which in turn often depend on the
individual's emotional inclination toward optimism or pessimism. No
one can prove scientifically that birth control, the New Deal, or the
atomic bomb denote progress in a desirable direction, because it is
impossible to control and measure objectively all the facts involved.
Judgments differ sharply. There is hardly any social change that is not
called progress by somebody. The concept is logically meaningless.
Fay, supra note 52, at 231.
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progress itself.
In the latter book, Rawls replaces the original position with an
area of overlapping doctrinal commonality that all members of
society share, although they may defend or justify it in different
126
ways.
He makes a distinction between a “comprehensive moral
127
doctrine” and a “political conception of justice.”
A
comprehensive moral doctrine includes “conceptions of what is
valuable in human life, as well as ideals of personal virtue and
character, that are to inform much of our nonpolitical
128
conduct[.]” It is their comprehensive moral doctrine that people
refer to when making substantive life decisions. A political
conception of justice is described by Rawls as a “module, an
essential constituent part that in different ways fits into and can be
supported by various reasonable comprehensive doctrines that
129
endure in the society regulated by it.”
A political conception of
justice is like a missing puzzle piece that can fit into and be the last
piece needed for completion in a variety of jigsaw puzzles. It is the
political conception of justice that all members of society share and
that serves as the overlapping consensus, the replacement for the
original position.
In short, Rawls’s argument is as follows: given the fact that
modern society is pluralistic, one must organize it in such a way
that difference and disagreement do not destabilize society itself.
The pluralism of a well-ordered society lies in the diversity of its
comprehensive moral doctrines. Since the modern state is a
representative democracy, various people, all of whom may hold
different opinions on fundamental matters, must interact in order
to make decisions. Those engaged in deliberation must have some
common ideas, otherwise interaction would be impossible,
unproductive, and chaotic. That which citizens share is the
overlapping consensus and it defines the standards by which
citizens qua citizens actually interact. Citizens refer to and debate
the details of the political conception of justice, but they believe in
it because their comprehensive moral doctrine justifies them in
126. Rawls defines an overlapping consensus as follows: “Such a consensus
consists of all of the reasonable opposing religious, philosophical, and moral
doctrines likely to persist over generations and to gain a sizable body of adherents
in a more or less just constitutional regime, a regime in which the criterion of
justice is the political conception itself.” RAWLS, supra note 101, at 15.
127. Id. at 145.
128. Id. at 175.
129. Id. at 145. See also id. at 12 (using nearly the same language).
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130

doing so.
There are two qualifications. The first is that public discussion
regarding the political conception of justice cannot be framed in
terms of beliefs that the society does not have in common. People
can challenge American law in terms of legal precedent or central
texts such as Martin Luther King, Jr.’s Letter from a Birmingham
131
Jail,
for example, but they cannot do so by invoking
132
denominational beliefs.
The second qualification is that the blueprint of the political
133
conception of justice begins with a public political culture.
Individuals in a society share certain beliefs and develop political
philosophies based upon what they already hold in common as a
134
society.
In other words, the device of representation that is the
original position comes from an already existing picture of what is
assumed to be just. It does not stand on its own; it describes
already existing social expectations.
The consequences of these two qualifications are problematic.
First, if the initial qualification is to be taken seriously, then only
those who share the commonality of the political conception of
justice are permitted to participate in society. This prevents
political change, since it limits social membership to those who
already agree with one another. I would argue that this really is not
130. For example, a Christian might believe that it is proper to pay taxes
because Jesus remarked that one should give Caesar what he is due, while a
capitalist might believe that it is proper to pay taxes because the money supplies
the government the means to regulate contracts and the free market. Both have
radically different justifications for paying their taxes, but both share an authentic
overlapping belief that one has a duty to do so.
131. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail, in LET FREEDOM
RING: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE MODERN CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (Peter D.
Levy ed., 1992). Rawls references the shared content of the public political
culture in Political Liberalism. RAWLS, supra note 102, at 8, 14, 25, 43, 175.
132. Of course, King’s letter invokes very specific denominational beliefs, and
one is forced to conclude, problematically, that for Rawls, it would be excluded in
public debate. One might argue that all King was doing was calling upon Aquinas’
theory of natural law, and therefore cites a text central to the democratic public
political culture, but Aquinas’ work also cited denominational beliefs and as such
would likely be excluded. Or, to use my previous example, the Christian is
prohibited from citing Jesus in a political context to persuade the capitalist.
133. RAWLS, supra note 102, 8–9.
134. For example, a case might be made that American citizens believe, almost
uniformly, that a constitutional democracy is the proper and ideal basic structure
for society. Rawls would then argue that any development of any theory which
came out of this public political culture would inevitably begin with the forming
of, or the intent to form, a constitution. Rawls's work appears to be no exception
to this rule.
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pluralism at all. The consequence of the second qualification is
that the device of representation known as the original position is
reduced to a product of the dominant political culture. It is
neither necessary nor does it have a normative impact in anything
135
other than a liberal democratic society.
Political Liberalism does contain a variety of progressive ideas
just as A Theory of Justice does. First, it regards contemporary liberal
politics as a conflict of groups rather than of individuals. Civil
rights are awarded to the individual, but each person is understood
as being a member of a tradition or belief system that provides
rational justification for his or her beliefs. Second, it sees day-today political decision making as a product of public persuasion and
constructed to ensure that all reasonable groups have the means
and vocabulary for participation in governance.
Third, it
recognizes that changes in society are matters of reform rather
than revolution—this is an important and rarely discussed
difference between the two books. The public political culture
changes over time, theoretically changing the comprehensive
moral doctrines that share it. Excluded groups may eventually
enter the arena of reasonable discourse if they change their
intolerant cores, but this involves stepping away from central beliefs
and key texts that are incompatible with modern liberal
democracies.
Rawls has a point, of course. Absolute tolerance of the
intolerant is likely impossible; even though Political Liberalism is not
as inclusive as A Theory of Justice, it still offers a significantly free
society—one with more liberty than most. Nevertheless, the
relevant question is whether or not acknowledging a possibly
unachievable ideal necessitates giving up all attempts at normative
standards. Kairys faces exactly this quandary regardless of which
period of Rawls we attach him to.
135. I defend and provide much more detail regarding these in the first
chapter of my dissertation. Jack Russell Weinstein, Adam Smith and the Problem
of Neutrality in Contemporary Liberal Theory (Apr. 24, 1997) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Boston University) (on file with author). For our purposes, we
should emphasize that Rawls has no claim to universality in his new argument.
That which justifies the overlapping consensus is the tradition or comprehensive
moral doctrine of the defender. That which makes the overlapping consensus
legitimate is simple commonality. One can certainly imagine numerous political
beliefs that may be held in common over a long period of time that are conducive
to neither freedom nor equality. Part of what makes a liberal society normatively
compelling is its ability to allow for new and radical ideas, like those put forth by
the American progressives a century ago.
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Suppose, for example, Kairys subscribes to the latter argument
in Political Liberalism and argues that only by being aware of
particular cultural and economic realities can the legal process be
fair. He then has to ask whether any individual circumstance or
belief system is worthy of being excluded from the process and
which circumstances have priority. To make determinations,
however, he has to appeal to some objective standard. Otherwise,
legal decision making becomes reduced to prejudice, tradition, or
habit. One would think that contemporary progressives would be
opposed to this approach even if, in the end, it is their prejudices,
traditions, or habits that set the standard.
It is worth remarking that even though a constitutional system
of law is built on precedent, it is rarely immediately clear whether
legal decisions are based on prejudices, tradition, or habit. Lack of
136
precedent may make legal decisions arbitrary,
but the
establishment of precedent still needs objective grounding in order
to have normative power. The debate about the existence of
natural law is essentially about providing this normative
foundation; natural law plays the role in American
constitutionalism that the original position plays in A Theory of
Justice.
Suppose, then, that Kairys sees his comments as consistent with
Rawls’s earlier book. In this case, he would likely argue that the
interpretation of the principles of justice and the test of their efficacy
are necessarily built on comparing their standards with the actual
lifestyles of those who are governed by them. Those who live in
squalor, for example, are not being treated properly according to
the principles of justice and are therefore subject to government
assistance in reaching the minimal acceptable standard, whatever w
turns out to be in that society.
The late philosopher would have likely endorsed this approach
without concern. I suspect that this is what Kairys would have had
in mind had he discussed progressivism from within a Rawlsian
framework, although he clearly would have sympathies with the
group dynamic of Political Liberalism as well. Nevertheless, this
approach presupposes that although the actual workings of the
legal system consider context, the process that leads to the
formation of the principles of justice cannot. Context is only a
136. This is why then-U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Harlan Stone called
the Nuremburg trials a “high-grade lynching party.” ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON,
HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 716 (Archon Books 1968).
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temporary measure, as, for example, the Supreme Court ruled in
137
This approach negates any criticism that ignoring
Bakke.
circumstance inherently invalidates the political system. In short, for
Kairys to be a progressive, he has to believe in progress. To believe
in progress, he has to have a compelling normative aim to progress
towards, and as Rawls’s career shows, although context may provide
a test for determining whether progress is being made, it only
seems to impair the identification of what it is that progress hopes
138
to achieve.
IV. MORALITY AND THE MARKET
Included in the concept of social progress is the idea of
economic justice; many of the progressive reforms were about
workplace issues and access to the material necessities of life. As
the history of progressive reform reminds us again and again, there
is a significant tension between the individualism of the democratic
process and the centralized nature of political philosophies and
polices that rely upon the state for the maintenance of an equal
playing field. Add to this the suspicion progressives tend to have
towards corporate interests, and one is forced to ask about the role
of capitalism in the progressive agenda.
Unger and West’s article—Progressive Politics and What Lies
Ahead—offers us three elements of a progressive agenda for
contemporary politics.
They argue that “society should be
independently organized outside the government,” in order to
strengthen, among other things, unions to better integrate
139
corporate “insiders” and “outsiders.”
This non-bureaucratic
approach to change, as we have repeatedly seen, has a long history
for progressives. They also argue that “the law should develop
137. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291–97 (1978) (noting
that, although civil rights legislation has often resulted from particular kinds of
discrimination against as few as one minority group, the universal language of this
legislation makes clear Congress’ intent to protect in equal measure the civil
liberties of all persons).
138. An attentive reader might be tempted to suggest I am guilty of creating a
false dichotomy, and argue that there are other forms of liberalism than just
Rawls’s two attempts. While I am sympathetic to this approach, I do not suggest in
this article that these are the only two options for contemporary liberal theory.
Instead, I am arguing that Rawls’s two positions are useful in articulating the
specific issue of context and its relationship to bureaucracy in progressive thought.
Insofar as this bifurcation stops being useful, I suggest a more nuanced discussion
of liberalism is called for.
139. Unger & West, supra note 39, at 15.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss1/1

36

Weinstein: On the Meaning of the Term Progressive: A Philosophical Investiga
1. WEINSTEIN - RC.DOC

2006]

11/21/2006 12:37:10 PM

ON THE MEANING OF THE TERM PROGRESSIVE

37

standards to give a central push in schooling and employment . . .
to those who suffer from an accumulation of forms of
disadvantage,” once again relying on the state to mitigate those
140
factors that popular political adjudication cannot.
Third, they
assert that “we should develop a broad based market-friendly effort
to lift up the economic rearguard,” offering specific plans for
independent management of diversified investments to “broaden[]
141
They suggest that “[t]he
. . . access to finance and technology.”
outcome of such experiments is not the suppression of the market;
142
it is the democratizing and diversification of the market.”
This last recommendation may seem out of place because of its
“conservative” elements. While we have already encountered
Rawls’s attempt to raise the economic bottom rung, doing so by
relying on the market, as Unger and West suggest, might seem
counter-intuitive to many on the left. Quite the contrary, though,
this approach is representative of the progressive tendency towards
reform rather than revolution. Any political theory that wants to be
taken seriously in today’s world must begin with capitalism,
especially in the short run. Completely rejecting free-market
solutions is to reject virtually all modern political arrangements. It
may also—and this point is controversial—run counter to human
nature. As Adam Smith wrote in 1776, whether we consider
advanced institutions of finance or the earliest forms of trade, it
may be that there is a “necessary, though very slow and gradual
consequence of a certain propensity in human nature . . . to truck,
143
barter, and exchange one thing for another.”
Exchange is a
progressive practice that may be the “necessary consequence of the
144
faculties of reason and speech,” unique to humans alone.
At the core of much skepticism about market solutions is the
modern view that the free market is somehow separate from moral
considerations. While there are many theorists working to develop
theories of a more moral marketplace, few, if any, on the left,
regard the market as itself inherently moral. At most, they may
regard it as a neutral tool reflecting the individual moralities of
economic agents. This section will focus specifically on the case of
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 13.
Id.
Id.
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS, I.ii.1–2, 25 (R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner eds., Oxford Univ. Press
1976) (1776) [hereinafter SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS].
144. Id.
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Adam Smith. What I hope to show, first, is that for Smith, relying
on the free market was, by design, a moral solution: what would
later be called capitalism was for him a system of morality. Second,
Smith argued that a well-structured free market can, by design,
145
raise the bottom rung of society.
While I will not go so far as to
suggest that Smith himself was a progressive, I will argue that
Smith’s theories share many elements with progressive political
approaches and that the identification of Smith as a conservative
icon is the result of a separation of morality and market that runs
counter to his own vision.
A. Adam Smith on Universal Opulence
For Smith, the free market is itself the consequence of
progress. Building on Turgot and heavily influencing Marx, Smith
sees political organization as dependent on economic
arrangements. Human history has witnessed the unfolding of four
economic stages beginning with the age of hunters, and moving
146
through pastoral, agricultural, and finally commercial societies.
147
There is no doubt that Smith sees this as progress.
Like many before him, Smith saw his epoch as the highest
stage, but unlike earlier notions of progress, he recognized that his
period was not the end goal. Instead, he was very much concerned
with the progress of “opulence,” as he called it, and argued that the
division of labor was the cause of “that universal opulence which
extends itself to the lowest ranks of people,” the result being that,
“a general plenty diffuses itself through the different ranks of the
148
society.”
His major concern is the refutation of mercantilism, an
economic theory that argued that the wealth of a nation was to be
measured by the amount of money in its borders at any given
149
Smith argued instead that it is the amount of labor in
moment.
150
any given society that adequately measures its wealth.
Wealth as
145. See generally id. at 1–60.
146. See id. at V.i.a.1–8, 689–94; ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE,
(A)I.27 1, 14 (R.L. Meek et al. eds., 1978) (1766) [hereinafter LECTURES].
147. His description begins with the classification of hunter-gatherers as “the
lowest and rudest state of society,” and refers to the middle stages as “more
advanced.” SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 143, at V.i.a.1–8, 689–94.
148. Id. at I.i.10, 22.
149. See generally id. at Book IV, 428 passim.
150. The very first sentence of the book argues that labor supplies a nation
with “all the necessaries and conveniences of life,” both through the product of
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seen from a mercantilist perspective is concentrated in the wealthy,
but when seen via Smith’s approach, all workers benefit from
economic advancement. Smith shared the progressive concern
(and Marx’s concern) for the laborer’s well being.
For Smith, economic growth was a matter of justice, not simply
the profit motive: “Servants, labourers and workmen of different
kinds, make up the far greater part of every great political society.
But what improves the circumstances of the greater part can never
151
be regarded as an inconveniency to the whole.”
He adds that
exceptionally low wages must be supplemented by other means of
152
sustenance in order to be “consistent with common humanity.”
He explains:
A man must always live by his work, and his wages must at
least be sufficient to maintain him. They must even upon
most occasions be somewhat more; otherwise it would be
impossible for him to bring up a family, and the race of
such workmen could not last beyond the first
153
generation.
Here, Smith is offering a precursor to Rawls’s maximin
principle—the assertion that agents in the original position will
seek the maximum minimum standard of living. The justification
for an economic system is whether it betters the living standard for
all its members, not just the wealthy. Comparing societies in
different economic stages, Smith insists that the difference in
economic circumstance between a European prince and the
“industrious and frugal peasant” is much less than that between an
African king and those tribal members over which he is, “absolute
154
master.”
In amplifying his critique of mercantilism, and against the
the labor and the goods exchanged with other countries, an exchange that could
not take place without labor. Id. at Intro.i.1, 10.
151. Id. at I.viii.36, 96. Smith adds,
No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater
part of the members are poor and miserable. It is but equity, besides,
that they who feed, cloath and lodge the whole body of the people,
should have such a share of the produce of their own labour as to be
themselves tolerably well fed, cloathed and lodged.
Id.
152. Id. at I.viii.16, 86.
153. Id. at I.viii.15, 85. Smith adds, “Thus far at least seems certain, that, in
order to bring up a family, the labour of the husband and wife together must, even
in the lowest species of common labour, be able to earn something more than
what is precisely necessary for their own maintenance.” Id. at I.viii.15, 85–86.
154. Id. at I.i.10–11, 22–24.
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physiocrats—those who believed that economic growth was the
155
result of agricultural development —Smith argued that economic
development was to a large extent the result of the interaction
156
between “the inhabitants of the town and those of the country.”
Despite the obvious competition, Smith is explicit that the town
157
and country share in a reciprocal relationship.
Nevertheless,
Smith argues, because “subsistence is, in the nature of things, prior
to conveniency and luxury,” when necessary, the country must take
precedence over the town when there is conflict: food comes
158
first.
We see that like Kant, Smith sees progress as the result of
159
interaction and tension.
In short, Smith sees economic
advancement as the aggregate of individual activities, and he
famously argues for a limited government to protect this sphere of
160
autonomy. Nevertheless, Smith’s government is not as limited as
is generally assumed. There are only three duties of the sovereign:
to protect the society from “violence and invasion” by other
societies; to protect “every member of the society from the injustice
or oppression of every other member”; and to erect and maintain
public works and institutions the cost of which are too great with
too few consequent benefits or profits for an individual or small
161
group to finance.
These public goods include armies, police,
public works, public schools, and general and religious
162
education.
155. Turgot was a physiocrat.
156. ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 143, at III.i.1, 376. He
explains: “The country supplies the town with the means of subsistence and the
materials of manufacture. The town repays this supply by sending back a part of
the manufactured produce to the inhabitants of the country.” Id.
157. Id. “[T]he division of labour,” he explains, “is in this, as in all other cases,
advantageous to all the different persons employed in the various occupations into
which it is subdivided.” Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. Smith, along with Turgot and the other physiocrats, thought that all
else being equal, individuals would prefer the tranquility and beauty of the
country and would always prefer to use their capital for agricultural purposes. But,
he adds “[i]f human institutions had never thwarted those natural inclinations, the
towns could nowhere have increased beyond what the improvement and
cultivation of the territory in which they were situated could support.” Id. at III.i.3,
377. Cultivation of the ground is, according to Smith, “the original destination of
man.” Id. As a result, “in every stage of his existence he seems to retain a
predilection for this primitive employment.” Id. at III.i.3, 378.
160. Id. at IV.ix.51, 687–88.
161. Id.
162. Of course, the term “public goods” is itself a matter of great controversy,
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Smith sees the state as contributing to the overall betterment
of society: it plays an important role in childhood and adult
education, it promotes literacy and attention to the arts, and it
cultivates social interaction to minimize loneliness and alienation,
163
to name just a few of its roles.
How deep the state’s
responsibilities towards these ends are for Smith is a matter of
controversy, but most contemporary Smith scholars ought to agree
that the discussion is infinitely more controversial than it should be
as a result of a major misstep in nineteenth- and early twentiethcentury commentary on Smith. What I argue here is that the
inaccurate view of Smith as a strict laissez faire conservative can be
remedied by taking a progressive point of view and by recognizing
that the architect of modern free-market theory recognized, as
Unger and West did two centuries later, that morality and the
marketplace are significantly intertwined and interdependent.
B. The Market as a Moral Influence
Famously, economist Joseph Schumpeter argued that The
164
Wealth of Nations did not contain one original idea. It is certainly
the case that Smith was well-versed in the literature of his time and
built heavily on the research of those who came before him; this is
of course what scholars do. But Schumpeter misses the point:
Smith’s great achievement was not his individual conclusions, but
165
his elegant and compelling system. It is therefore not surprising
that the most enduring impediment to understanding Smith’s work
is the stubborn attempt to push aside those elements of his system
that are incompatible with the laissez faire caricature of Smith. This
but Smith has no particular attachment to a minimalist conception of it. Smith’s
theories are perfectly compatible with a more inclusive notion of public good. As
Jeremy Z. Muller explains, Smith, “argued against government involvement less as
a matter of principle than as a matter of strategy, and he was willing to depart from
that strategy when there were compelling reasons.” JERRY Z. MULLER, ADAM SMITH
IN HIS TIME AND OURS 140 (1993) (emphasis in original).
163. I have argued elsewhere, in great detail, about the role of the state in
providing non-economic support for individuals in society. See, e.g., JACK RUSSELL
WEINSTEIN, ON ADAM SMITH (2001); Jack Russell Weinstein, Sympathy, Difference and
Education: Social Unity on the Work of Adam Smith, 22 ECON. & PHIL. 79 (2006)
[hereinafter Weinstein, Sympathy, Difference and Education]; Jack Russell Weinstein,
Adam Smith’s Philosophy of Education, 3 ADAM SMITH REV. (forthcoming 2006).
164. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 184–85 (Elizabeth
Boody Schumpeter ed., Oxford University Press 1954).
165. Schumpeter does recognize the value of Smith’s system, but he
underestimates, in my view, its overall impact. See generally id.
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includes Book Five of The Wealth of Nations, which continues the
important discussion of the role of the state in a market economy;
but even more so, fidelity to the caricature necessitates the
complete rejection of Smith’s first and highly successful book The
Theory of Moral Sentiments.
First published in 1759 while Smith was Chair of Moral
Philosophy at Glasgow college, the stated purpose of The Theory of
Moral Sentiments is to investigate the nature of virtue and how it is to
166
be acquired.
Unlike Kant, who is ultimately a rationalist, Smith
sees virtue as acquired through our senses. By observing others,
entering into their very specific perspectives, and developing an
impartial conscience to be the final judge of our own action, moral
actors discover general rules of morality that then guide their
167
actions. Essential to this experience what Smith calls sympathy—
168
the process of fellow feeling with another person.
A spectator
observes a person’s act, endeavors to understand the context that
166. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS VII.i.2, 265 (D.D.
Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds., Liberty Classics, 1992) (1759) [hereinafter SMITH,
MORAL SENTIMENTS].
167. Id. at III.4.8, 159–60.
168. Social and moral unity is also enabled through sympathy, which Smith
distinguishes quite explicitly from its standard usage denoting sharing only “the
sorrow of others.” Id. at I.i.1.5, 10. Sympathy allows for the “original passions”
that makes one person’s happiness “necessary” to another, and makes people
“naturally” interested “in the fortune of others,” even though a person “derives
nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it.” Id. at I.i.1.1, 9. It is the natural
capacity that allows for moral judgment, although Smith is less than precise in his
definition of this central concept. He defines sympathy as a “fellow-feeling with
any passion whatever” aroused in a spectator, but then spends much of the rest of
the text qualifying and investigating its limits. Id. at I.i.1.5, 10. Smith is an
empiricist, coping with the fundamentally separate nature of human beings. Our
physical separation therefore requires a moral theory derived from sensations and
events occurring to others. See Henry J. Bittermann, Adam Smith’s Empiricism and
the Law of Nature I, 48 J. POL. & ECON. 510 (1940). Sympathy is a “cognitive
process,” inspiring both change of “circumstances” and “personhood” with others.
Philippe Fontaine, Identification and Economic Behavior: Sympathy and Empathy in
Historic Perspective, 13 ECON. & PHIL. 261, 264 (1997). According to Smith,
sympathy, through observation of a moral actor, causes “an analogous emotion” to
“spring up” in the “breast” of an “attentive spectator.” SMITH, MORAL SENTIMENTS,
supra note 166, at I.i.1.5, 10. It is, by “changing places in fancy with the sufferer,
that we come either to conceive or to be affected by what he feels.” Id. at I.i.1.3,
10. This adoption of the perspective of another is, according to many
commentators, an attempt to, “temper the self-centerdness of our perspective.”
Russell Nieli, Spheres of Intimacy and the Adam Smith Problem, 48 J. HIST. IDEAS 611,
617 (1986). It is also an effort to “deflect the criticism that sympathy is founded
on self-love.” Robert Sugden, Beyond Sympathy and Empathy: Adam Smith’s Concept of
Fellow-Feeling, 18 ECON. & PHIL. 63, 75 (2002).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss1/1

42

Weinstein: On the Meaning of the Term Progressive: A Philosophical Investiga
1. WEINSTEIN - RC.DOC

2006]

11/21/2006 12:37:10 PM

ON THE MEANING OF THE TERM PROGRESSIVE

43

gave rise to the act, and then makes a moral judgment as to
whether the person was acting appropriately to the cause. If the
spectator judges that a particular act was appropriate—if the
spectator is able to determine, while taking the specific and unique
perspective of the actor, that he or she would act in the identical
manner—then the spectator is said to sympathize with the person.
This harmonization of sentiments is the arbiter of that which is
ethical.
The Theory of Moral Sentiments begins with the assertion that
although it is often assumed that human beings are purely selfish,
there are natural inclinations within each person to care about
169
others. Smith is explicit that human beings are not egoistic, they
are not only concerned about others, and that their identities are
170
Moral
largely constructed by the society that raises them.
judgments, like judgments of beauty, are impossible outside of
171
society. He writes:
We can never survey our own sentiments and motives, we
can never form any judgment concerning them; unless we
remove ourselves, as it were, from our own natural station,
and endeavour to view them as at a certain distance from
us. But we can do this in no other way than by
endeavouring to view them with the eyes of other people,
or as other people are likely to view them. Whatever
judgment we can form concerning them, accordingly,
must always bear some secret reference, either to what
are, or to what, upon a certain condition, would be, or to
what, we imagine, ought to be the judgment of others.
We endeavour to examine our own conduct as we imagine
any other fair and impartial spectator would examine it.
If, upon placing ourselves in his situation, we thoroughly
enter into all the passions and motives which influenced
it, we approve of it, by sympathy with the approbation of
this supposed equitable judge. If otherwise, we enter into
172
his disapprobation, and condemn it.
Here Smith prefigures Rawls’s critics. Substantive judgments
must be contextual. To know yourself is to know how others see

169. SMITH, MORAL SENTIMENTS, supra note 166, at I.i.1.1, 9.
170. See generally Jack Russell Weinstein, ON ADAM SMITH (2001) (chapter three
is particularly relevant to his point); Weinstein, Sympathy, Difference and Education,
supra note 163.
171. SMITH, MORAL SENTIMENTS, supra note 166, at III.i.2, 109–10.
172. Id. at III.i.2, 110.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006

43

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 1
1. WEINSTEIN - RC.DOC

44

11/21/2006 12:37:10 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:1

you. A word of caution is necessary, however. Even though Smith
is striving for some form of impartiality, it is not an Archimedean
perspective. There is no God’s-eye view and there can be no
original position. Individuals need self and social knowledge to
morally adjudicate matters.
Foreshadowing twentieth-century identity politics, Smith
spends a great deal of time discussing how group identity such as
gender, class, and race (as represented by a discussion of slavery)
173
inhibit understanding amongst people.
He also offers an
extended discussion of how the desire to be rich and the
community’s celebration of those who are rich, distort moral
174
judgment.
The sympathetic core of this first book, combined with Smith’s
critical attitude towards the wealthy, makes for an uneasy
partnership between The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of
Nations, according to some. Citing the so-called “Adam Smith
Problem,” scholars have repeatedly argued that the two books are,
175
simply put, inconsistent.
The first is based on altruism, they
argue, and the second is based on egoism.
This view, in its contemporary manifestation, is one of the
great barriers to progressive thought. Since morality and the
market are assumed to be incompatible, it is argued, the
progressive philosophy that relies on both must be selfcontradictory. Altruistic morality cannot, the argument continues,
be compatible with selfish economic motive, by definition.
However, as is the case for those who make this argument against
progressives, those who argued against Smith in this manner were
deeply mistaken.

173. See generally Weinstein, Sympathy, Difference and Education, supra note 163.
174. Smith explains:
This disposition to admire, and almost to worship, the rich and the
powerful, and to despise, or, at least, to neglect persons of poor and
mean condition, though necessary both to establish and to maintain the
distinction of ranks and the order of society, is, at the same time, the
great and most universal cause of the corruption of our moral
sentiments.
SMITH, MORAL SENTIMENTS, supra note 166, at I.iii.3.1, 61.
175. See, e.g., JAMES R. OTTESON, ADAM SMITH’S MARKETPLACE OF LIFE (2002);
VIVIENNE BROWN, ADAM SMITH’S DISCOURSE: CANONICITY, COMMERCE AND
CONSCIENCE (1994); PETER MINOWITZ, PROFITS, PRIESTS, AND PRINCES: ADAM SMITH'S
EMANCIPATION FROM POLITICS AND RELIGION (1993); KENNETH LUX, ADAM SMITH'S
MISTAKE: HOW A MORAL PHILOSOPHER INVENTED ECONOMICS AND ENDED MORALITY
(1990).
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Sometimes described as a translation mistake, the motivation
of the Adam Smith Problem was as political as it was
176
philosophical. The German thinkers saw Smith’s philosophy as a
threat in two ways. First they feared that the “Adam Smith School”
sought to “monopolize manufacturing in England” and were
threatened by the individualistic emphasis they viewed as
“opposition to the older cameralistic tradition that assumed that
177
Second, they
society and its members needed guidance.”
“conflated the ideals of the French revolution with Smith’s legacy”
and hoped to “‘overcome” Smith and Rousseau’s “rationalistic
178
Enlightenment.”
Only in the past thirty years have scholars
collectively challenged its legitimacy, reasserting that sympathy is
not altruism and that self-interest is neither the single motive for
economic activity nor purely egoistic.
179
The short solution to the Adam Smith Problem is as follows:
first, making oneself more moral and living in a more just and
more ethical community is a form of bettering oneself, and Smith
never suggests that betterment is entirely economic. Second, and
perhaps more importantly, sympathy is not a form of altruism at all
and The Wealth of Nations is not built entirely on selfish behavior. As
we have already seen, Smith’s treatise on political economy is rife
with ethical considerations.
C. The Butcher, the Brewer, the Baker, and the Invisible Hand
Smith’s two most famous assertions are often cited as the basis
for the incompatibility. First: “It is not from the benevolence of the
butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but
from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not
to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of
180
our own necessities but of their advantages.”
Smith’s argument
here is that economic activity is governed by self-interest, an
assertion that has developed into a modern unquestionable truth.
Commercial activity advances as individuals pursue their own
176. See BRUNO HILDEBRAND, DIE NATIONALÖKOMMIE DER GEGENWART UND
ZUKUNFT (1848); CARL G. KNIES, DIE POLITISCHE OEKONOMIE VOM STANDPUNKTE DER
GESCHICHTLICHEN METHODE (1883); WITOLD VON SKARZYNSKI, MORALPHILOSOPH
UND SCHOEPFER DER NATIONALOEKONOMIE (1878).
177. LEONIDAS MONTES, ADAM SMITH IN CONTEXT 20–24 (2004).
178. Id. at 24–28.
179. See Jack Russell Weinstein, Review: James W. Otteson’s “Adam Smith’s
Marketplace of Life”, 113 MIND 202 (2004) (discussing this point in more depth).
180. SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 143, at I.ii.2, 27.
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needs, this approach assumes.
This was a revolutionary assertion. Theorists who argued
versions of it before Smith were often condemned, largely because
181
of Christian attitudes towards selfishness.
While there is no
doubt that Smith’s intent was to tout the economic benefits of selfinterest, these were not his only intentions. The second assertion is
that “[n]obody but a beggar chuses to depend chiefly upon the
182
The beggar relies on
benevolence of his fellow-citizens.”
benevolence sometimes but on barter at other times. People’s
motivations change. Sometimes they are altruistic, sometimes they
are not. According to Smith “[w]e address ourselves, not to [the
183
Butcher’s, Brewer’s, and Baker’s] humanity but to their self-love.”
However, we could choose to do otherwise, because in each of these
184
For Smith,
agents, Smith is clear, “their humanity” is present.
“man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren,
and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only.
He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his
185
favour.”
Smith comes to a pragmatic and not a philosophical
conclusion here. We can appeal to people’s benevolence, and
sometimes it will result in our assistance, but we will be more likely to
succeed if we appeal to their commercial instincts. The comment
about the self interest of the butcher and the baker is ultimately a
186
comment about persuasion.
Smith is also famous for referencing the invisible hand: the
metaphor he uses to describe the economic progress of a market
187
economy.
In both of his books, the phrase is meant to indicate
181. See BERNARD MANDEVILLE, THE FABLE OF THE BEES: PRIVATE VICES, PUBLICK
BENEFITS (F.B. Kaye ed., Liberty Classics 1988) (1705). This is the most significant
work arguing this point before Smith. It was first published as one volume in
1732, but published separately in pieces starting with The Grumbling Hive in 1705.
182. SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 143, at I.ii.2, 27 (emphasis added).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at I.ii.2, 26 (emphasis added).
186. STEVEN J. MCKENNA, ADAM SMITH: THE RHETORIC OF PROPRIETY 134 (2006).
In fact, as we have already noted, commercial activity is itself, for Smith, “the
necessary consequence of the faculties of reason and speech.” SMITH, WEALTH OF
NATIONS, supra note 143, at I.ii.2, 25. It is built on “the natural inclination
everyone has to persuade.” SMITH, LECTURES, supra note 146, (A) vi.57, 352. As a
result, according to Smith, “everyone is practicing oratory on others thro the
whole of his life.” Id.
187. Smith uses the phrase three times: The two times mentioned below, and a
third time as a reference to primitive religions. ADAM SMITH, ESSAYS ON
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that individuals’ economic self-interest results in adequate
distribution of goods for most members of the society. The
metaphor serves two purposes. First, it highlights the role of
unintended consequences, as in The Wealth of Nations:
By preferring the support of domestick to that of foreign
industry, he intends only his own security; and by
directing that industry in such a manner as its produce
may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain,
and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible
hand to promote an end which was no part of his
188
intention.
In contrast, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith
complements his comment about the economic differential
between European princes and their serfs. He writes:
The rich only select from the heap what is most precious
and agreeable. They consume little more than the poor,
and in spite of their natural selfishness and rapacity,
though they mean only their own conveniency, though
the sole end which they propose from the labours of all
the thousands whom they employ, be the gratification of
their own vain and insatiable desires, they divide with the
poor the produce of all their improvements. They are led
by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution
of the necessaries of life, which would have been made,
had the earth been divided into equal portions among all
its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without
knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and afford
189
means to the multiplication of the species.
It is noteworthy that Smith’s use of the invisible hand in his
economic treatise is really about politics and social engineering,
190
and its use in his treatise on morality is largely about economics.
This latter claim, that because of the rapacity of the rich, the poor
191
However, two
have what they require, seems prima facie false.
things might be said in his defense. The first is that Smith did not
anticipate modern shifts in the accumulation of capital or
revolutionary technologies like refrigeration that enable the

PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECTS 29 (W.P.D. Wightman & J.C. Bryce eds., Liberty Classics
1982) (1795).
188. SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 143, at IV.ii.9, 456.
189. SMITH, MORAL SENTIMENTS, supra note 166, at IV.1.10, 184–85.
190. This comes with one qualifier, as I shall indicate later.
191. Weinstein, On Adam Smith, supra note 163, at 65–66.
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consolidation of wealth and goods in extreme quantities. The
second is that Smith is claiming that “necessaries” are distributed
192
fairly, but not luxuries. Smith is little concerned with the latter.
On the other hand, there is a strong element of truth in his
approach. The “rapacious” desires of modern day celebrities
employ huge numbers of workers and the American and Western
European way of life is responsible for vast economic activity
around the globe. Smith himself, in an overwhelming and quite
beautiful passage, enumerates the thousands of people involved in
193
the manufacture of a simple woolen coat. From Smith’s point of
view, free trade increases labor which increases wealth in all trading
nations. Protectionism is simply a modern form of mercantilism.
More important, it is worth noticing that in the midst of his
economic discussion is an ethical observation. Smith’s ultimate
point in The Theory of Moral Sentiments is that material wealth is not
the final arbiter of happiness, and that, “in ease of body and peace
of mind, all the different ranks of life are nearly upon a level, and
the beggar, who suns himself by the side of the highway, possesses
194
that security which kings are fighting for.”
The invisible hand
supplies material goods but the capacity for morality and happiness
comes from elsewhere.
There is a romanticism here that must be condemned, of
course. Being forced to beg is not pleasurable, and no matter how
we read Smith, all of his writing will never be suited to the
contemporary sensibilities.
Modern notions of justice have
progressed, if I may use the word, and our understandings of
oppression and inequality have grown significantly more
sophisticated. Nevertheless, what is important for our purposes is
not whether all of Smith’s claims are empirically correct, but
whether his theoretical filter can be of use to us, as I argue that it
can. What is most useful about Smith’s work for the modern
progressive is his deep understanding of the intimate relationship

192. As we have already touched upon, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith
argues that the rich are ridiculously overattentive to luxury and that it is a sign of
bad character to be so. SMITH, MORAL SENTIMENTS, supra note 166, at I.iii.3.1, 61–
62. In The Wealth of Nations, he critically claims that, “with the greater part of rich
people, the chief enjoyment of riches consists in the parade of riches, which in
their eyes is never so compleat as when they appear to posses those decisive marks
of opulence which nobody can possess but themselves.” SMITH, WEALTH OF
NATIONS, supra note 143, at I..xi.c.31, 190.
193. SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 143, at I.i.11, 22–24.
194. SMITH, MORAL SENTIMENTS, supra note 166, at IV.i.10, 185.
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between economic and moral life. Sympathy regulates behavior
between known parties: family members, friends, neighbors, and
colleagues. As Smith argues in graphic detail, duty governs
behavior between those who have no contact and little sense of a
195
shared world.
The market, however, governs the behavior that
falls through the cracks between sympathy and duty, and, at least
Smith argues, if those who are in need can harness the self-interest
of others, each person will have an easier time finding his or her
means of survival, as the beggar ultimately received from the
butcher, brewer and baker, all of whom, in return, received from
the beggar their own lunch.
Ultimately, then, the resolution to “The Adam Smith Problem”
necessitates thinking like a progressive. Readers ought to be willing
to start from the assumption that morality and the market are not
only compatible but complementary. They will understand Smith
better if they reject the notion that the market is either neutral or
inherently unjust, and progressive points of view will regain a
powerful ally in their fight for a more just economic system. Unger
and West were not at all inconsistent in looking towards the market
to achieve progressive aims. The market, when maintained by the
state, when governed under the right conditions, when
complemented by education, arts, and a supportive community,
can be a useful and moral force for social and economic progress.
V. CONCLUSION: A TENTATIVE DEFINITION OF THE TERM
PROGRESSIVE
196

Reform comes from a myriad of sources.
Yet, progressive
reforms are of a particular type. They seek fundamental change
but hope to maintain the society they critique; they assume a
particular end but recognize that their goals may be a long time
coming; they demand democratic participation but recognize the
centralization and collective nature necessary to support
individuals; they idealize the goal of impartiality but understand
the necessity of context; and they bridge a spectrum of issues that
195. Id. at III.3.4–7, 136–39. To make this point in The Theory of Moral
Sentiments, he uses the example of the duty a European would have to people in
China who are the victim of a terrible earthquake. Id.
196. Adam Smith himself referred to The Wealth of Nations as a “very violent
attack . . . upon the whole commercial system of Great Britain.” ADAM SMITH,
CORRESPONDENCE OF ADAM SMITH 251 (E.C. Mossner & I.S. Ross eds., Liberty
Classics 1987) (1776).
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range over all areas in society. While the American progressive
movement has only been identified as such for slightly longer than
a century, its philosophical foundation has been evolving slowly for
hundreds of years longer.
I began this discussion by lamenting the lack of a
straightforward definition for the term progressive. Especially in
197
the American context, the label is complex and nuanced.
I am
reluctant to offer a definition of the term, despite this lengthy
philosophical inquiry. Nevertheless, the nature of this essay
demands an attempt on my part to do so, and I therefore offer the
following tentative definition: a progressive is a person who believes
that social reform is achievable over time with the proper mixture
of individual participation and government support. He or she
looks to the future not the past for a better time, and recognizes
that there is a universal standard for justice while acknowledging
that only by understanding particular contexts and circumstances
can the adequacy of the progress be measured. All people are
equally entitled to the fruits of progress, the progressive believes,
but how these fruits are distributed may depend on the nature of
circumstance.
Group identification is therefore essential to
understanding any individual’s situation but it should not eclipse
an individual’s unique situation or perspective. In short, the
progressive seeks moderation: moderation in change, moderation
in assistance, and moderation in autonomy. Perhaps then, the
democratic activist mentioned at the outset of this article was
correct after all.

197. For example, even though neither Rawls nor Smith are, strictly speaking,
progressives, their insights into social justice and economic life help articulate the
philosophical assumptions that provide progressivism its depth and sophistication.
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